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Linking Brain to Behavior in Normals and Schizophrenics 
An outstanding problem in psychology and neuroscience concerns how to link 
discoveries about brain mechanisms to the behaviors that they control. A related problem 
in psychiatry is to understand how abnormal behaviors arise from breakdowns in the 
brain mechanisms that govern normal behaviors. During the past few decades, neural 
models have been getting developed of how normal cognitive and emotional processes 
learn from the environment, focus attention and act upon motivationally important events, 
and cope with unexpected events. When arousal or volitional signals in these models are 
suitably altered, they give rise to symptoms that strikingly resemble negative and positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia, including flat affect, impoverishment of will, attcntional 
problems, loss of a theory of mind, thought derailment, hallucinations, and delusions. 
These models thus suggest how an imbalance that is created in otherwise normal brain 
mechanisms can ramify throughout the brain to create the clinical symptoms that are 
observed. 
Another key theme in these models is that constraints on brain development and learning 
greatly constrain the kinds of information processing that govern both normal and 
abnormal behaviors. For example, one of these models is called a CogEM model, because 
it joins together Cognitive, Emotional, and Motor processes (Grossberg, 1982, 1984b). 
The CogEM model tries to explain how emotional centers of the brain, such as the 
amygdala, interact with sensory and prefrontal cortices (notably ventral, or orbital, 
prefrontal cortex) to generate affective states, attend to motivationally salient sensory 
events, and elicit motivated behaviors. Closing the feedback loop between cognitive and 
emotional centers is predicted to generate a cognitive-emotional resonance that can 
support conscious awareness. When such emotional centers become depressed, negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia emerge in the model (Grossberg, 1984a, 2000b ), as 
summarized below. Such emotional centers are modeled as opponent affective processes, 
such as fear and relief, whose response amplitude and sensitivity are calibrated by an 
arousal level and chemical transmitters that slowly inactivate, or habituate, in an activity-
dependent way. These opponent processes exhibit an Inverted-U whereby behavior 
become depressed if the arousal level is chosen too large or too small. Underaroused and 
overaroused depression can be distinguished clinically by their parametric properties. 
Negative symptoms arc proposed to be due to the way in which depressed affective 
opponent processes interact with other circuits, notably cognitive and motor circuits, 
throughout the brain. 
A related model suggests how brain mechanisms of cognitive learning, attention, and 
volition work, and may give rise to positive symptoms like hallucinations during 
schizophrenia and other mental disorders. This Adaptive Resonance theory, or ART, 
model (Grossberg, 1980, 1999b) proposes an answer to the "stability-plasticity dilemma;" 
namely, how the brain can learn quickly throughout life without being forced to forget 
previously learned memories just as quickly. ART proposes how normal learning and 
memory may be stabilized through the use of learned top-down expectations. In other 
words, we are "intentional" beings so that we can learn quickly without suffering 
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catastrophic forgetting. These expectations learn prototypes that are capable of focusing 
attention upon the combinations of features that comprise conscious perceptual 
experiences. When top-down expectations are active in a priming situation in the absence 
of bottom-up information, they can modulate or sensitize their target cells to respond 
more effectively to future bottom-up information that matches the prototype. Such 
expectations cannot, however, fully activate these target cells under most circumstances. 
When bottom-up inputs do occur, an active top-down expectation selects the cells whose 
input features are consistent with the active prototype, and suppresses those that are not. 
This matching process can synchronize and amplify the activities of selected cells. Such a 
matching process has been mathematically proved to be necessary to stabilize the 
memory of learned representations in response to a complex input environment (e.g., 
Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991 ). In order to realize these matching properties, top-down 
expectations and attention were predicted to be controlled by top-down on-center off-
surround networks. A balance between top-down excitation and inhibition in the on-
center of this network leads to the modulatory effect in the on-center on its target cells, 
even while cells that are in the off-surround may be strongly inhibited. Recent 
psychophysical and neurophysiological data have supported this prediction; see Raizada 
and Grossberg (2003) for a review. 
The ART model proposes how the brain has exploited the modulatory property of 
expectations and attention to enable fantasy, imagery, and planning activities to occur. In 
particular, phasic volitional signals can shift the balance between excitation and 
inhibition to favor net excitatory activation when a top-down expectation is active. Such a 
volitionally-mediated shift enables top-down expectations, in the absence of supportive 
bottom-up inputs, to cause conscious experiences of imagery and inner speech, and 
thereby to enable fantasy and planning activities to occur. If, however, these volitional 
signals become tonically hyperactive during a mental disorder, the top-down expectations 
can give rise to conscious experiences in the absence of bottom-up inputs and volition. 
Many data about schizophrenic hallucinations can be clarified by these model properties 
(Grossberg, 2000a). Related work has predicted the detailed laminar circuits within the 
visual cortex wherein these top-down expectations and volitional signals may act, and by 
extension in other sensory and cognitive neocortical areas (Grossberg, 1999a, Grossberg 
and Raizada, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003). ART also predicts that the contents 
and level of abstractness of learned prototypes may determine the contents and 
abstractness of hallucinations. A similar breakdown of volition may lead to delusions of 
control in the motor system. 
Attention, Affect, and Volition in Schizophrenia 
This CogEM and ART models bring a new perspective to thinking about the well-known 
fact that schizophrenia involves a Joss of attentional control, motivational defects, and 
disorganized behavior. Kraepelin (191311919) early noted that "This behavior is without 
doubt clearly related to the disorder of attention which we very frequently find 
conspicuously developed in our patients. It is quite common for them to Joss both 
inclination and ability on their own initiative to keep their attention fixed for any length 
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of time" (pp. 5-6). Attentional deficits in schizophrenia have also been emphasized by a 
number of other workers; e.g., Bleuler (1911/1950), Braff (1985) and Mirsky (1969). 
Since the time of Kraepelin, many efforts have been made to classify schizophrenic 
symptoms across distinct patient populations, including the basic classifications into 
negative and positive symptoms, or deficit and nondeficit symptoms (Buchanan et al., 
1997; Bustillo et al., 1997). Liddle (1994) has segregated schizophrenic symptoms into 
"three distinguishable syndromes: (1) psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, flat affect, 
decreased spontaneous movement); (2) disorganisation (disorders of the form of thought, 
inappropriate affect); and (3) reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations)" (p. 43), 
which have been supported by several studies (Arndt et al., 1991; Pantelis et al., 1991; 
Sauer et al., 1991). Liddle suggested that two of these syndromes "reflect volitional 
disorders: psychomotor poverty reflects a difficulty initiating activity and disorganisation 
reflects a difficulty in the selection of appropriate activity" (p, 43). Both of these 
problems are, moreover, associated with impairment in neuropsychological tests of 
frontal lobe function. 
In a different direction, Frith (1992, 1994) has interpreted schizophrenic symptoms as 
impairments in the processes that underlie a "theory of mind", including the ability to 
represent beliefs and intentions. For example, when asked to describe photographs of 
people, schizophrenics described their physical appearance, rather than their mental states 
(Pilowsky and Bassett, 1980). Frith noted, however, that the theory of mind approach 
"does not explain the other major feature of negative schizophrenia: their impoverishment 
of will." (Frith, 1994, p. 150). He also wrote that "mental states include not only affects 
and emotions, but also goals and intentions. A person who was unaware of their goals 
could, on the one hand, be a slave to every environmental influence or, on the other hand, 
be prone to perseverative or stereotyped behaviour, because they would not have the 
insight to recognize that certain goals were unobtainable or inappropriate" (Frith, 1994, p. 
151). 
All of these properties have explanations using CogEM and ART. In particular, these 
models analyze how attention is regulated during normal cognitive and cognitive-
emotional interactions, and how it breaks down when these normal processes experience 
some sort of imbalance. Such models point to processes that have not been as actively 
considered as they might be towards explaining schizophrenic behavioral symptoms. 
Gated Dipole Opponent Processing 
One such process is opponent processing, whether of opponent emotions, like fear and 
relief, or of opponent perceptual features, like reel and green. Opponent processing plays a 
key role in controlling the dynamical reset and rebalancing of sensory, cognitive, 
emotional, and motoric representations in response to rapidly changing environmental 
inputs. Such opponent processing circuits exhibit a Golden Mean of optimal behavior at 
an intermediate arousal level (Grossberg, 1972, 1980, 1984a, 1984b). For larger or 
smaller levels of arousal, behavior deteriorates in different ways, thereby giving rise to an 
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Inverted-U as a function of arousal level. In particular, when arousal is too small, such an 
opponent process causes an elevated behavioral threshold, since there is not enough 
arousal to support a more normal threshold. Paradoxically, it also gives rise to behavioral 
hyperexcitability when this elevated threshold is exceeded. When arousal is too small, the 
opponent process causes a low behavioral threshold. Paradoxically, it also gives rise to 
behavioral hypoexcitability when this reduced threshold is exceeded. Due to these 
properties, an increase in arousal can decrease the sensitivity of an underaroused 
opponent process of this kind, and can bring it into the normal behavioral range. The 
model proposes that, in this way, a pharmacological "up" like amphetamine can reduce 
the hypersensitivity of attention deficit disorder children. These properties emerge 
through interactions across the entire opponent processing circuit. They cannot be 
understood just by looking at the pharmacology or neurophysiology of individual cells 
within the circuit. How such opponent processes work during normal behavior and 
schizophrenia is described in Grossberg (1984a, 1984b, 2000b). When their output 
signals become depressed, such opponent processes are predicted to lead to various 
symptoms of flat affect. When their effects ramify throughout the sensory and prefrontal 
cortices with which they interact, they can lead to all the negative symptoms that are 
summarized above. 
Negative Symptoms as Emergent J>ropet·ties of System-Wide Intemctions 
The most immediate effect of a depressed response in the outputs of emotion-representing 
areas is flat affect, although how this is understood must be carefully evaluated; see 
below. This defect, in turn, causes an inability to represent others' beliefs and intentions, 
in the sense that all mental states that depend upon interpreting one's own emotional 
state, or the emotional states of others, will be diminished. This happens in the CogEM 
model because emotionally charged sensory inputs, such as the emotional expressions on 
other people's faces, will activate the appropriate part of inferotemporal cortex but will 
not elicit an appropriate emotional response from the amygdala and related emotion-
representing circuits; see Figure 1. As a result, photos of people would necessarily be 
described physically, rather than in terms of emotionally relevant mental states (Pilowsky 
and Bassett, 1980). 
Figure 1 
A problem with impoverishment of will, as well as with the setting of goals and 
intentions, will then indirectly arise. This happens in the model because the depressed 
response of the emotional representations depresses the incentive motivational signals 
that would normally activate the prefrontal cortex in response to motivationally salient 
events (Figure 1). As a result, the prefrontal cortex will not be adequately activated, and a 
hypofrontal condition will emerge (Weinberger, 1988). Due to this hypofrontality, the 
working memory representations and plans that are ordinarily formed within the 
prefrontal cortex will be degraded, so goals will not form in a normal fashion. 
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Given a hypofrontal response, top-down signals from the prefrontal cortex to the sensory 
cortices will also be reduced or eliminated (Figure 1). As a result, the sensory 
representations will not be able to use these top-down signals to organize information-
processing according to its emotional meaning or motivational goals. Said in another 
way, motivationally irrelevant information will not be blocked from attention, so it will 
be able to continually intrude, leading to distractability. Or, in Kraepelin's words, 
schizophrenics "lose both inclination and ability on their own initiative to keep their 
attention fixed for any length of time." 
Neurobiological Correlates 
The CogEM model also clarifies the following types of anatomical, neurophysiological, 
and biochemical data. The amygdala, and related structures, has been identified in both 
animals and humans to be a brain region that is involved in learning and eliciting 
memories of experiences with strong emotional significance (Aggleton, 1993; Davis, 
1994; Gloor et al., 1982; Halgren eta!., 1978; LeDoux, 1993). The orbitofrontal cortex is 
known to be a major projection area of the ventral, or object-processing, cortical visual 
stream (Barbas, 1995; Fulton, 1950; Fuster, 1989; Rolls, 1998; Wilson et al., 1993), and 
cells in the orbitofrontal cortex are sensitive to the reward associations of sensory cues, as 
well as to how satiated the corresponding drive is at any time (e.g., Mishkin and 
Aggleton, 1981; Rolls, 1998). Ubiquitous positive feedback occurs between cortical 
regions (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Macchi and Rinvik, 1976; Sillito et al., 1994; 
Tsumoto, Creutzfeldt, and Legendy, 1978), including prefrontal and sensory cortices. In 
addition, the ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala are involved in the process by 
which responses are selected on the basis of their emotional valence and success in 
achieving rewards (Damasio et al., 1991; Passingham, 1997). In particular, Ft1ster (1989) 
has concluded from studies of monkeys that the orbital prefrontal cortex helps to suppress 
inappropriate responses. These monkey data are consistent with clinical evidence that 
patients with injury to orbital prefrontal cortex tend to behave in an inappropriate manner 
(Blumer and Benson, 1975; Liddle, 1994). Other research has suggested that 
schizophrenia may involve a chronic deficiency in striatal glutamate transmission due to 
decreased activity in those regions of the prefrontal cortex that project to the striatum 
(Andreasen, 1990; Carlsson, 1988; Grace, 1991; Lynch, 1992). The CogEM model 
suggests that one possible cause of decreased prefrontal activity may be a reduction in 
incentive motivational signals from depressed amygdala circuits that project to the 
prefrontal cortex. 
Some Open Questions and the Need For Quantitative Brain/Behavior Models 
A brief verbal summary such as I have just attempted leaves out so many details that it is 
subject to misinterpretation. In the case of the CogEM and ART models, whatever be 
their shortcomings, they offer a precise mechanistic explanation of how interactions 
among model brain mechanisms give rise to normal and abnormal behavioral properties. 
The same is not true of intuitive and heuristic attempts to explain schizophrenic 
symptoms which, albeit necessary to advance our understanding, are inherently too weak 
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to unambiguously bridge the gap between brain and behavior. The discussion above 
raises a number of questions when it is confronted by various recent data. For example, it 
has been proposed that some schizophrenics who exhibit symptoms of flat affect may 
experience more intense emotions than ordinarily supposed, particularly negative 
emotions, and that flat affect is due to the fact that their observable responses are reduced 
(e.g., Alpert et al. 2000). The essential property for explaining the effects of flat affect in 
the CogEM model is that a late stage in emotional processing, one that feeds incentive 
motivational signals to the prefrontal cortex, is depressed and thereby negatively impacts 
sensory, cognitive, and motoric processing. Earlier stages of emotional processing may be 
intact without disrupting model predictions. This being said, questions remain about how 
some of these patients were tested - in particular, using verbal stories about emotional 
situations is not necessarily a reliable way to assess experienced emotion. 
It has been suggested that flat affect may not be a primary symptom of schizophrenia 
because flat affect and hallucinations to not always covary (Serper et al., 1996). The 
CogEM and ART models clarify, however, that these two types of symptoms may be clue 
to distinct brain mechanisms. It has also been suggested that the early appearance of flat 
affect, before schizophrenic symptoms occur, and the fact that it is sometimes not 
followed by such symptoms (Alpert, 1985), may suggest that it is only a "risk factor" for 
schizophrenia (Alpert and Angrist, 2003). Given that there are many reasons why an early 
symptom may not immediately lead to a fully blown syndrome, one might just as well 
wonder if the early onset does not provide some evidence that it can be a cause. For 
example, autoreceptors can, in various brain systems, maintain a robust system response 
until such a large loss is experienced that they can no longer compensate for it. Such 
compensatory effects may be occurring in, say, the amygdala-to-prefrontal pathways. 
Experiments to study this and related pathways more closely would be most valuable 
towards clarifying this issue. 
More generally this article points to bow well-known psychological processes such as 
affective opponent processing, top-clown expectations, incentive motivation, volitional 
gating, and attentional blocking may break down in schizophrenics. Neural models like 
CogEM and ART, by describing these processes clearly and quantitatively, may make il 
easier to think about and test their implications when they are subjected to one or another 
kind of imbalance. 
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1. Figure 1. (a) The simplest Co gEM model: Three types of interacting rcprcscntafions (sensory, drive, and motor) 
that control three types of learning (conditioned reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor) may be used to 
explain many learning data. Sensory representations temporarily store internal representations of sensory events. 
Drive representations are sites where reinforcing and homeostatic, or drive, cues converge to activate emotional 
responses. Motor representations control the read-out of actions. Conditioned reinforcer learning (CRL) enables 
sensory events to activate emotional reactions at drive representations. Incentive motivational learning (JML) 
enables emotions to generate a motivational set that biases the system to process information consistent with that 
emotion. Motor learning allows sensory and cognitive representations to generate actions. In order to work well, a 
sensory representation must have (at least) two successive stages, so that sensory events cannot release actions that 
are motivationally inappropriate. These stages are interpreted as sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex representations 
of the sensory event. The prefrontal stage requires motivational support from a drive representation to be fully 
effective. The amygdala is interpreted as one important part of a drive representation. Amydgala inputs to prefrontal 
cortex cause feedback to Sensory cortex that selectively amplifies and focuses attention upon motivationally relevant 
sensory events. (b) When a drive representation like the amygdala gets depressed (gray box), diminished activation 
of its outputs in response to sensory events depresses motivational inputs to the prefrontal cortex in response to 
emotionally important events, and hereby attenuates motivationally-appropriate signals to and from the prefrontal 
cortex (dashed lines). As a result, motivationally irrelevant events are not attentionally suppressed, and prefrontally-
mediated plans and actions are insufficently activated. 
